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Expected Cost of Equity and the Expected Risk Premium in the UK 
 
In this paper, it is argued that previous estimates of the expected cost of equity and the 
expected arithmetic risk premium in the UK show a degree of upward bias.  Given the 
importance of the risk premium in regulatory cost of capital in the UK, this has 
important policy implications.  There are three reasons why previous estimates could 
be upward biased.  The first two arise from the comparison of estimates of the realised 
returns on Government Bond (“Gilt”) to realised and expected returns on equities.  
These estimates are frequently used to infer a risk premium relative to either the 
current yield on index-linked gilts or an “adjusted” current yield measure.  This is 
incorrect on two counts; first, inconsistent estimates of the risk free rate are implied 
on the right hand side of the CAPM (Jenkinson, 1993); second, they compare realised 
returns from a bond which carried inflation risk with realised and expected returns 
from equities which may be expected to have at least some protection from inflation 
risk.  The third, and most important, source of bias arises from uplifts to expected 
returns.  If markets exhibit “excess volatility” (Shiller 1981), or if part of the historical 
return arises because of revisions to expected future cash flows, then estimates of 
variance derived from historical returns or price growth must be used with great care 
when uplifting average expected returns to derive simple discount rates.  Adjusting 
expected returns for the effect of such biases leads to lower expected cost of equity 
and risk premia than those that are typically quoted.    
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Expected Cost of Equity and the Expected Risk Premium in the UK 
 
Introduction 
A focus of some recent work on the equity risk premium has been the resolution of 
the risk premium puzzle identified by Mehra and Prescott (1985).  Campbell (1999), 
and Dimson, Marsh and Staunton (2002, 2006, 2007) show that the puzzle exists in 
the international data as well as the US data.  The observed historical premia over 
both Treasury Bills and Government Bonds are too high to be consistent with any 
plausible degree of relative risk aversion on the part of investors.  Attempts to resolve 
the problem include modifications to the theoretical models that determine the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion, a useful review of which is in Cochrane (Chapter 
21, 2001), and analyses that examine the effect of revisions in cash flow expectations 
on the historically observed risk premium (Fama and French, 2002; Dimson et al, 
2006).  Similar to Fama and French (2002), this paper contributes to the latter body of 
work by estimating the UK risk premium based upon rational historical expectations 
of the ex ante equity return and risk premium.  As in Dimson et al (2006) and Vivian 
(2007) a dividend growth (“Gordon‟s growth”) model is used, but the estimates are 
constructed by incorporating growth terms based both on dividend growth and 
earnings growth.  For completeness the implied cost of capital from the forward 
earnings growth (FEG) model of Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) model.  This 
requires estimates of both short run and long run earnings growth, and for the latter 
estimates are made using the long run average earnings estimates using the approach 
on Robert Shiller‟s website.1  Thus this study should be viewed as complimentary to 
that of Dimson et al (2006) and Vivian (2007) in these respects.
2
 
 
A further puzzle that has been observed in past equity prices is the “excess volatility 
puzzle” (Campbell, 1996; Campbell and Shiller, 1988).  Historically, the volatility of 
returns seems too high to be reconciled with the observed volatilities in dividend and 
consumption growth, and this volatility exacerbates the problem of explaining the 
observed equity risk premium as it implies a degree of mean reversion in stock prices. 
Furthermore, as Cochrane (2001, p. 460) points out, these standard deviations are so 
                                                 
1
 See: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data/ie_data.xls 
2
 The incorporation of an earnings growth estimate comes at a cost.  Whilst Dimson et al (2006) 
provide dividend growth estimates back to 1900, from the data used in this study it is only possible to 
obtain historical series back as far as 1924 for dividends and 1927 for equities.   
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high that they imply a large amount of uncertainty about the true equity risk premium, 
a fact that he describes as a “surprisingly underappreciated problem”. 
 
Whilst it is widely recognised that revisions in cash flow expectations have 
implications for the estimation of the ex ante risk premium, there seems to be little 
explicit recognition of the importance of the excess volatility studies for this ex ante 
premium
3
.  One line of argument is that if the expected premium is not serially 
correlated, then the correct approach to estimating the annual discount rate for 
equities is to use the arithmetic risk premium.  However, there are three caveats here.  
First, whilst advocating the use of expected simple one period returns in discounting, 
Fama (1996) highlights the fact that discounting forecast net cash flows by such 
discount rates implies that the distribution of these cash flows more than one period 
ahead are right-skewed. Second, Blume (1974) shows that the arithmetic average of 
an historical series of data gives rise to an upward biased estimate of the N-period 
return, whilst the geometric average is downward biased.  He proposes an horizon-
weighted average of the arithmetic and geometric average returns to deal with this 
problem.  Third, if there is autocorrelation in past returns, then it does not follow that 
the arithmetic average will give a reliable measure of simple one period ahead returns, 
although in a simulation study Indro and Lee (1997) show that Blume‟s (1974) 
recommendation of an horizon-weighted average exhibits the least bias compared to 
alternative estimators. In related work, Cooper (1996) shows that in the presence of 
estimation error and serial dependence in returns, the corrected discount rate is closer 
to the arithmetic mean of the historical series than the geometric mean.  However, 
Cooper (1996, p.165) acknowledges that “it may be that the correct model of returns 
is more complex than that analysed here”.  One of the purposes of this paper is to 
attempt to estimate just such an alternative model of expected returns. 
 
If expected returns are lognormally distrubuted, from Jensen‟s inequality the 
arithmetic average risk premium should be approximately the geometric average risk 
premium plus half the variance.  Dimson et al (2002, p.193) use a 16% estimate of 
projected market volatility when moving from geometric to arithmetic averages, 
                                                 
3
 An exception is Vivian (2007, p. 1508) who notes “An important advantage of the UK dividend 
growth model is that it does provide a more precise estimate of the equity premium since the variance 
of the dividend model is considerably smaller than that generated by average returns especially since 
1950” 
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equivalent to an uplift of 1.3%.  Fama and French (2002) argue that price growth is 
more volatile than dividend growth, and so any estimate of the ex ante risk premium 
needs to be adjusted to allow for this.  In general, if such adjustments are formed on 
the basis of historically measured variances a problem that arises is that historically 
observed price growth embeds both the effects of unanticipated cash flow growth and 
any “excess volatility” resulting from irrational pricing movements.  Unless one 
expects both of these effects to continue into the future, or alternatively rejects the 
notion of “excess volatility” altogether, any historical estimate of price growth 
variability will be an over-estimate of the expected variance.  As the volatility from 
the historically estimated long run dividend growth series is considerably lower than 
either the volatility of past stock prices or contemporaneous market volatility 
estimates, it can be argued that any estimates of the ex ante arithmetic premium 
derived by adjusting dividend growth model estimates for observed price volatility are 
over-estimates. This line of argument also depends on the interpretation placed on 
such forward estimates.  Fama and French (2002, p.638) regard the average of such 
estimates as an estimate of the unconditional expected stock return.  By contrast, 
Claus and Thomas (2001, p.1630) regard their ex ante estimates as conditional on the 
information available in any one year, and specifically note “we do not consider an 
unconditional equity premium toward which those conditional premia might gravitate 
in the long run”.  This difference in interpretation is of critical importance in 
identifying the correct estimate of the ex ante simple annual return, as under the Claus 
and Thomas (2001) interpretation no adjustment would need to be made to the mean 
estimated premium, in contrast to the Fama and French (2002) recommendation.  
Although the main focus is on the arithmetic average return, an added benefit of a 
more precise (i.e. less volatile) estimate of any equity return or risk premium is that it 
helps in addressing the “surprisingly underappreciated problem” that Cochrane (2001) 
highlights.
4
 
  
The equity risk premium in the UK is of central importance to regulators, who make 
use of it both in setting utility prices and in market investigations, to investors and the 
                                                 
4
 It should be noted that Dimson et al (2006) conducts a world-wide decomposition analysis using 
geometric returns and is altogether less strong in advocating the use of arithmetic averages, noting that 
“For those who focus on the arithmetic mean” the world arithmetic average premium is 1.3% higher 
than its geometric counterpart, although in the concluding paragraph a geometric world risk premium 
of 3 to 3.5% is used to suggest an arithmetic premium of 4.5% to 5%.   
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investment community, and to corporate finance departments.  Precisely because of 
the UK regulatory regime, an accurate estimate of the risk premium is of particular 
concern in this country.  In a recent report for Ofgem, Wright et al (2006) argued in 
favour of an uplift of 2% in obtaining the arithmetic risk premium from the the 
geometric risk premium  on the grounds that such an uplift is “conservative”.   Others 
might regard such an uplift as being not necessarily in the interests of consumers.  In 
addition, regulators appear to impart two further sources of bias in the estimation of 
the risk premium.  The reason is that regulators and their advisors have typically 
estimated a real premium relative to either government bonds (“Gilts”) or Treasury 
Bills, and then added this to a contemporaneous estimate of the real risk free rate. A 
recent example can be found in the recent NERA review for the latest water industry 
2009 price review
5
, where they argue for a 5.4% risk premium based largely upon 
long run arithmetic averages and add that to a 2.5% estimated risk free rate of return.  
There are two problems with this line of reasoning.  The first goes back to Jenkinson 
(1993) who argues that there is only one risk free rate in the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM).  As such, it is inappropriate to incorporate an equity risk premium 
derived using one risk free rate, the historical figure, in the CAPM if the first term on 
the right hand side (RHS) uses a different estimate of the risk free rate, the current 
rate.  This bias suggests that either historical estimates of the risk free rate should be 
used throughout, or that the appropriate term to incorporate on the RHS of the CAPM 
is an estimate of the expected return on equities, from which the current risk free rate 
is deducted.  In a similar vein, Wright et al (2003)
6
 argue against the separate 
estimation of the risk free rate and an equity risk premium on the grounds that 
estimates of the return on equities exhibit more stability than estimates of the equity 
risk premium. 
 
The second bias in the current regulatory approach is rather more subtle.  The 
problem here, in the case of the analysis of the historical expected equity premium, is 
that there is a danger of comparing expected returns on equities, which may be to 
some degree insulated from inflation risk, with ex post realised returns on bonds, 
which are not.  The appropriate approach would be to compare the ex ante estimate of 
real equity returns with the ex ante estimate of real gilt returns, using common 
                                                 
5
 See: http://www.nera.com/extImage/PUB_Cost_of_Capital_PR09_Jan2009_update.pdf 
6
 Sometimes referred to as the “Smithers Report”. 
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estimates of inflation.  This implies using yearly estimates of government bond yields 
to redemption, rather than realised returns.  Such an analysis, in nominal terms, is 
undertaken by Claus and Thomas (2001), but this contrasts with the approach used in 
studies of historical investment returns (e.g. Barclays Capital (2007), Dimson et al 
(2007)) which typically take the risk premium over gilts as the realised real equity 
return minus the realised real bond return.  This approach is not wrong if one is 
concerned with the historical returns actually earned by investors, but it will give a 
misleading estimate if combined with an inflation-protected index linked gilt (ILG) 
yield to give an estimate of the current risk premium. 
 
A related potential bias is the long-standing insistence by regulators that “market 
distortions” mean the observed yield on ILGs may be unreliable, and so an uplift is 
required.  This can either be because of “Bayesian updating” arguments to the risk 
free rate, cited by Europe Economics (2009) on behalf of Ofwat,
7
 or because the 
regulator thinks the market rate itself may be unreliable.  For example, the latest 
relevant Competition Commission report on Bristol Water observes “ current index-
linked yields are about 1 per cent. As they may still be affected by market distortions 
we considered that a range of 1 to 2 per cent for the risk-free rate was appropriate” 
(Competition Commission, 2010, p.65).  However, this is not in itself wrong if 
regulators recognise that this figure should be compared to expected return on 
equities, as indeed the CC does.  The danger is that a regulator may uplift the risk free 
rate and then add to that an estimated risk premium, a path that appears to have been 
followed by Ofwat in its “PR09” price determination.  However, regulators are 
changing tack, and the CC‟s recent approach avoids any bias by explicitly estimating 
the cost of equity directly, and then deducting the estimated risk free rate.  This 
approach was also followed in the Stansted Airport inquiry.  Whilst the result gives a 
small advantage to firms with betas that are less than unity, it is an approach that is 
unbiased and theoretically consistent. 
 
Finally, outside the regulatory sector there is evidence, albeit dated, from Gregory, 
Rutterford and Zaman (1999) that suggests the corporate sector may be making errors 
in estimating cost of capital.  Intriguingly, though, the same study (which specifically 
                                                 
7
 See: http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/pricereview/pr09phase3/rpt_com_20091126fdcoc.pdf 
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compares industry perception with those of the City) suggests that half of their 
investor group used far lower estimates of cost of capital than the industry group.  For 
this group of investors the risk premia being applied were considerably lower than 
those that have been used by regulators. 
 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the above sources of potential bias in 
estimates of the UK ex ante equity cost of capital and of the risk premium, and to 
calculate bias-free estimates of these series depending on alternative beliefs 
concerning price volatility.  As these potential biases are positive and significant, the 
paper has policy implications for UK regulators, and for others with an interest in the 
UK equity cost of capital.  The paper proceeds by describing the research method and 
data used in the study, and then describes the results of the analysis. 
 
 
Method and Data 
The research method is conceptually extremely simple, and relies on the fact that in 
rational markets, the price of any equity must be the present value of the future 
dividend stream.  Given the interest is in the expected return, Rm,  on a market-wide 
portfolio, expressing prices in terms of an expected forward real dividend yield on the 
market, and assuming constant real growth in perpetuity, implies that expected returns 
are given by: 
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where Dt+1 is the real dividend one period hence, and gt is the long run real growth in 
prices.  Provided the real dividend yield is stationary, long run real price growth will 
be equivalent to the long run real growth in dividends.  The problem is how to 
estimate expectations.  Initially, as in Fama and French (2002, hereafter FF), the 
assumption is that real dividend growth (GDt) is simply a function of the most recent 
period‟s real dividend growth, where real dividends are defined by dt.(RPIt-1/RPIt), 
RPIt is the level of the retail price index at time t, and dt is the nominal dividend at 
time t, and GDt = (dt/dt-1) .(RPIt-1/RPIt).  Given this simplifying assumption 
concerning dividend growth, we can estimate the historical series of expectations as: 
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There are alternative methods of estimating growth.  The first, possibly more 
applicable to the US than the UK, recognises that that if there is a trend towards the 
use of share buybacks, a better estimate of long run growth in prices may be the 
earnings growth rather than dividend growth.
8
  As in FF
9
, this estimate of real price 
growth, GYt, is given by  (yt/yt-1) .(RPIt-1/RPIt), where yt is the nominal earnings figure 
in year t.  However, there is no particular reason to suppose that investors naively 
form growth expectations each year on the basis of the last year‟s dividend or 
earnings growth, as assumed by FF.  Alternative specifications are possible, so for 
example one could use rolling multi-year average estimates of dividend or earnings 
growth as a proxy for growth over the trade cycle.  Dimson et al (2002) use the full 
historical run of data in any year to give an estimate of expected growth, although 
their approach has the different objective of calculating unexpected dividend growth.  
Vivian (2007) shows that the both short run and longer run (5 year) dividend growth 
appears to be predictable in the 1965-2004 period, implying that an econometric 
model of dividend growth may be a possibility, although he shows that out-of-sample 
a long run average has superior predictive power.  These alternatives are estimated 
later, but the important point is that such estimates of future return will generally 
exhibit lower volatility than estimates formed using naïve annual revisions.  As such, 
the standard conclusions drawn from the basic estimates made in this paper may be 
aggressive in terms of their implications for arithmetic average returns.  With longer-
run estimates of dividend growth, the standard deviation of the GDt term would be 
depressed leading to a smaller standard deviation of expected equity returns.  Indeed, 
we show this is exactly the case when we estimate a time-varying dividend yield 
approach.   
 
                                                 
8
 Note that an alternative approach to the problem of share buybacks is the use of a share-buyback 
adjusted dividend yield, as in Vivian (2007). 
9
 Fama and French (2002) note that any variable that is cointegrated with stock price can be used to 
derive (1), so that if firms move away from dividend payout, implying that the dividend-price ratio is 
non-stationary, forming a growth expectation on the basis of earnings growth will be valid provided 
that the real earnings yield is stationary. 
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There are alternative approaches to estimating cost of equity than the use of a 
dividend discount model.  Claus and Thomas (2001) prefer a residual income 
approach, which they claim offer advantages over the dividend discount model and 
“make better use of available information”.  Whilst the Claus and Thomas results are 
useful (they report a mean risk premium over 10-year government bond rates of 3.4% 
for the US and 2.8% for the UK), their argument in favour of the residual income 
model rather than the dividend discount model is flawed.  Properly applied, with 
consistent assumption, one is bound to get the same answer from the residual income 
model as from the dividend discount model (Lundholm and O‟Keefe, 2001).  The 
differences between the DDM and RI analyses in their paper come about solely as a 
result of inconsistent assumptions in the growth rates assumed, rather than the model 
application per se.  A weakness of the RI model is that it requires estimates of book 
value to be available, and additionally requires that accounting income is measured on 
a “clean surplus” basis.  Observing book values over the long term, which is what is 
required here, is extremely onerous.  Furthermore, until very recently UK accounting 
has made use of “dirty surplus” accounting, particularly with regard to goodwill 
accounting and asset revaluation.  The FEG model has the considerable advantage 
that it does not require accounting to be “clean surplus” (Ohlson and Juettner-
Nauroth, 2005 p. 353).  In its simplified two period growth form, the authors show 
that the model can be solved for an implied cost of capital.  Expressed in terms of the 
notation used above, the authors show that 
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and LtGY is an estimate of long term earnings growth made at time t. 
 
As the focus of this paper is real returns, real dividend growth and price gains in any 
year are deflated by realised inflation (as measured by the retail price index) over the 
year. Monthly data are available for UK prices from 1915 onwards.  Besides the 
equity data, returns on Treasury Bills, and Yield to Redemption data on UK 
Government Gilts are required.  Consistent with the method used to estimate real 
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future dividend, price and earnings growth, estimates of the expected real yield to 
redemption figures are derived by assuming that the past year‟s realised inflation is an 
unbiased estimator of the expected future inflation rate. 
 
To estimate the dividend, earnings and price series requires long run market wide 
data.  Dimson et al (2006) use their own estimates for the largest 100 UK companies 
for the early years of their sample, in contrast to with the Barclays Capital (2007) 
study which uses the thirty largest companies.  In this study, the data source of 
earnings, price and dividend information for the early years (pre the formation of the 
FT All Share Index) is the Global Financial Data (GFD) database.
10
  GFD is also used 
as the source of data for early gilt yields, prior to long run bond yields being available 
on Datastream.  The early gilt yields are based on Consol yields.  GFD is also the 
source of inflation data prior to the UK retail price index being available on either 
Datastream or from the Office of National Statistics.  It is important to emphasise that 
GFD has been selected as the descriptions of the data indicate that it is more widely 
based than the Barclays Capital data.
11
  Real dividends payable to investors are 
estimated as the simple 12 month average of the monthly dividend yields multiplied 
by the monthly equity price index, appropriately deflated by the RPI.  In a similar 
fashion, earnings are calculated as the simple 12 month average of the monthly 
earnings yield, appropriately deflated.  The annual estimates the real dividend and real 
earnings yields are illustrated in Figure 1.   
 
To estimate long-run earnings growth an approach identical to that employed by 
Robert Shiller
12
 is employed, namely a rolling average of the ten year real earnings on 
the index is calculated.  This also allows the calculation of a long run average 10 year 
trailing PE (PE10) to be calculated.  In principle, one can estimate the implied cost of 
capital on a rolling basis from (3) above.  Unfortunately, the formula breaks down 
under circumstances when short run earnings growth is smaller than long run earnings 
growth by a sufficient margin to render the term under the square root sign in (3) 
above negative.  In such circumstances the choice is either to artificially constrain 
short run earnings growth, or to conclude that a cost of capital cannot be calculated 
                                                 
10
 Dimson et al (2006) use this same database as their source for the Canadian market.  A full 
description of the data used by GFD can be found in Appendix 1. 
11
 Although it should be noted that gilt, Treasury Bill and inflation data are similar.   
12
 See footnote 1. 
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for some years.  Neither alternative is terribly appealing, particularly as the latter 
implies ignoring observations where economic circumstances are likely to be adverse.  
So instead, the model is employed here only in relation to the entire run of data. 
 
Finally, we employ regression models to estimate short run dividend growth.  We 
show that there is evidence that short run dividend (and to a lesser extent earnings) 
growth can be forecast, particularly at the one year horizon.  We then employ those 
growth estimates in a simple re-statement of (1) to directly estimate the expected 
dividend one period hence.  We combine this with a rolling long run average estimate 
of the dividend (or earnings) growth to provide an alternative estimate of expected 
returns. 
 
Results 
Historical returns 
We start with the analysis of historically estimated ex ante returns, which are reported 
in Table 1.  The average real dividend yield (Dt/Pt-1) of 4.58% is very close to the long 
run average real dividend yield of 4.7% recorded by FF, although the UK does not see 
the systematic decline in the average ratio reported in FF.  The arithmetic average 
long run real growth in dividends (GDt) is 1.21%, less than the FF US figure of 
2.08%.  The geometric average of this dividend growth, reported in the bottom panels 
of Table 1, is 0.9%, higher than the Dimson et al (2006) UK growth estimate for 
1900-2005 of 0.61%.  To understand the difference in these estimates, we can use the 
detailed year-by-year breakdown of dividend income provided by Barclays Capital 
(2007), whilst recognising that these Barclays Capital data are based on a smaller 
universe of the thirty largest UK stocks.  Their data paints a gloomier picture of UK 
growth than Dimson et al, with a very small decline in real dividends over the whole 
period (Figure 88, Barclays Capital 2007).  However, this is largely driven by a fall of 
real dividend income of 86% from 1900 to 1919.
13
  The Barclays Capital implied real 
dividend growth over the period 1925-2006 is approximately 1.2% p.a..  Dimson et al 
                                                 
13
 I am grateful to Tim Bond at Barclays Capital for the following response to a query on the dividend 
income index: “On the start point, dividends in our sample indeed fell steeply in the first year or so. 
That reflects the usual impact of changes in constituents and changes in dividends. Then WW1 
intervenes, which has a major impact on div policy amongst British companies.  The methodology we 
used to construct the index is described in the study and it does not change over this period, so it 
reflects what was going on in the 30 largest capitalised stocks over this period.”  
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(2005, Ch. 3) have a useful international analysis on the relationship between 
dividend growth and GDP growth, showing that dividends lag substantially behind 
GDP growth in all the countries studied.  Their World figure for real dividend growth 
was 0.64%, compared to real GDP growth of 3.22%, and real per capita GDP growth 
of 2.24% (Dimson et al, 2002, Table 12).   
 
Over the period for which earnings data are available (1927 on, so allowing growth 
estimates to be made for the year 1928 on), Table 1 shows that the arithmetic average 
UK earnings growth (GYt) is 1.22%, with a geometric average of only 0.39%.  The 
fact that arithmetic average earnings growth and dividend growth are broadly similar 
over the long run lends some comfort to the use of the conventional dividend growth 
model in the UK, as it suggests that share buybacks are not a material problem.  
Furthermore, since 1951 geometric real dividend growth (0.9%) has been 
considerably higher than real earnings growth (0.39%).  This contrasts sharply with 
the US picture of FF, where real geometric earnings growth since 1951 has been 
1.89%, over double the geometric growth in real dividends of 0.92%.  A contributory 
factor here has been the serious decline in earnings during the current recession, and 
the fact that aggregate dividends have fallen by less than aggregate earnings.  
Nonetheless, the arithmetic averages show that since 1975 real earnings have grown 
at a higher average rate than dividends (2.59% average earnings growth compared to 
2.08% average dividend growth).  As would be expected, earnings growth is more 
volatile than dividend growth and the standard deviations of the annual values show 
that earnings growth has a standard deviation of 12.65% over the whole period 
compared to a standard deviation of 7.92% for dividend growth.  Similar to the US 
estimates of FF, the volatility of earnings growth is nonetheless lower than the 
volatility of price growth.  Whilst the long run geometric mean of real price growth, at 
1.2%, is reasonably close to the dividend growth rate, and about 0.81% higher than 
the earnings growth, the long run arithmetic mean of price growth is 3.24% p.a..  The 
standard deviation of annual price growth, at 20.14% is far in excess of the standard 
deviations of earnings growth or dividend growth.  The time series of these estimates 
are illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
We now use these dividend and earnings growth estimates to calculate the implied 
expected returns on equity, using model (1) above with growth estimates using either 
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the dividend growth series ([2] above) or the earnings growth as an estimate of the 
growth in dividends.  Recall that in the first instance we naively assume that investors 
project forward using just their latest experience of real growth, and so our estimates 
are likely to be quite volatile ones. Such naïve projections give the estimates in 
columns 7 and 8 of Table 1.  The mean historical expected real return on equities 
derived from the dividend growth model, RDt, is 5.79%.  The estimate is remarkably 
stable over the 1925-1950 and 1951-2009 sub-periods analysed (5.96% and 5.72% 
respectively), but the 1975 to 2009 average is higher at 6.25%, reflecting the more 
rapid rise in real dividends over that period (arithmetic average 2.08%).   Although 
the overall RDt estimate is below the 1872-2000 FF US estimate of 6.78%, the 1951-
2009 figure of 5.72% exceeds the FF 1951-2000 expected return of 4.74%.  However, 
the findings for the UK are similar to those for the US in one critical respect.  FF 
contrast the observed total real shareholder return on the US market of 8.81% with 
their expected return of 6.78%, noting that the difference is particularly acute in the 
1951-2000 period (9.62% realised versus 4.74% expected).  For the UK, the 
arithmetic average realised real return, Rt, for the full period of 8.14% contrasts with a 
5.79% RDt figure
14
.  As in the US, the 1951-2006 period is the driver of the difference 
between realised and expected real returns, with average returns of 9.12% and 5.72% 
respectively.   
 
When expected price growth is estimated from earnings growth, there is only a small 
impact on UK expected returns, in contrast to the FF study.  The resulting estimates of 
expected returns resulting from assuming growth is equal to earnings growth gives a 
mean RYt of 5.8%, only 0.01% greater than the 5.79% RDt estimate.  In the individual 
sub-periods, differences do arise but these are primarily due to the volatility of 
earnings.  Whereas the expected return for the dividend growth model varies from a 
low of 5% (1951-75) to a high of 6.25% (1975-2009), the figures for the earnings 
growth model range from 4.01%  to 6.76% for the same two sub-periods. These 
contrast with the arithmetic average of the realised real return on the market for these 
two sub-periods being 9.29% and 8.99% respectively.  It is again worth remembering 
that the volatility of the dividend and earnings estimates, modest as they may be 
compared to the volatility of the realised returns, is in part attributable to the 
                                                 
14
 Note that the full period geometric average realised return is 5.78% which contrasts with the Dimson 
et al (2007) geometric average of 5.5%.  This simply reflects the shorter period of this study. 
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assumption that investors naively assume that the last year‟s realised real growth in 
dividends or earnings is indicative of future long run growth. We later relax this 
assumption of investor naivety by explicitly modelling expectations of short run and 
long run dividend growth, showing that we get less volatile estimates by so doing. 
 
As we discussed above, the Jenkinson (1993) argument for consistency in applying 
the CAPM is persuasive, suggesting that to obtain a contemporaneous estimate of the 
forward risk premium it is preferable to combine an estimate of expected equity 
returns with an observed current risk free rate, either in nominal or in real terms.  
Nonetheless, it is still valid to ask how these forward estimates would have been 
formed historically, and so the last three columns in Table 1 present the average ex 
ante premia expected over the real Treasury Bill rate.  These are presented for both 
the dividend growth (RXDt) and earnings growth (RXYt) models, together with the 
realised returns (RXt).  The long run arithmetic average risk premium over Bills from 
the dividend growth model is 4.61%, and varies from a low of 3.5% in the 1975-2009 
sub-period to a high of 5.56% for the 1951-75 sub-period.  The first period of the 20
th
 
century does not produce an estimate wildly different from the later period of the 
study (1951-2009), although it does show a decline in the expected risk premium, 
with an expected premium over bills of 5.13% compared to a later period premium of 
4.37%.  The average estimate from the earnings growth model is 4.82%.  These 
figures stand in marked contrast to the arithmetic average risk premium of 6.95% over 
bills that we observe from realised returns, and can also be compared to the arithmetic 
premium over bills for the UK quoted in Dimson et al (Table 10, 2007) of 6.2%.  The 
important implication is that the long-run historical expected arithmetic risk premium 
over bills may have been 2.34% less than that the estimate obtained by an analysis of 
historical observed premia over the whole period, with an increased divergence of 
2.75% being evident from 1975 on.. 
 
Of course, in any analysis of the historical risk premium, there is always an analysis 
of the return on equities compared to the realised return on government bonds, and 
indeed for long term planning (by corporates, investors and regulators) the cost of 
equity compared to long term interest rates is likely to be far more important than a 
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cost compared to short term interest rates.
15
  Dimson et al (Table 11, 2007) show that 
for the UK the arithmetic average of this premium is 5.4%, or 0.8% less than the 
premium earned over Treasury Bills.  However, as argued above, there is a problem 
of consistency when examining ex ante returns.  The correct procedure should be to 
use the same expectations in estimating long bond returns as in estimating long run 
equity returns, which implies using the contemporaneous inflation rate coupled with 
the contemporaneous gilt yield.  The results of this analysis are shown in Table 2
16
, 
and the effect is to further decrease the historical expected risk premium.  The 
arithmetic average of the expected real returns on gilts are shown in Table 2, Column 
1, and the arithmetic average risk premium figures over gilts are shown as RXgDt (the 
premium from the dividend growth model) and RXgYt (the premium from the earnings 
growth model).  These are contrasted with the realised equity returns compared to gilt 
yields (RXgt) in the final three columns of Table 2.  The first point of note is that the 
expected arithmetic average risk premia are over 1% less than that obtained using the 
Treasury Bill rate, at 3.54% and 3.73% from the dividend and earnings growth models 
respectively.  Second, for the dividend growth model in particular, the expected risk 
premium shows little variation through the sub-periods.  This is important, as when 
consistent approaches to expected inflation are taken in gilt and equity ex ante return 
estimation, the expected premium only varies between a low of 3.37% in the first sub 
period and 3.90% in the second sub-period.  The contrast with the Treasury Bill 
approach comes about because from the first column of Table 2, it can be seen that 
investors always expect a positive real return on gilts in every sub-period, and this 
expected return only varies between a low of 1.1% (second sub-period) and a high of 
2.83% (third sub-period).  By contrast, column 2 of Table 1 shows that in the second 
sub-period, investors actually experienced, on average, a negative real return on 
Treasury Bills.  Previous studies of historically realised returns on gilts (e.g. Dimson 
et al, 2007) have shown a similar gap between the arithmetic average of real Treasury 
Bill and gilt returns, but also show a higher volatility of realised gilt returns.  Dimson 
et al (2007, Tables 8 and 9) show that the geometric average, arithmetic average and 
standard deviation of Treasury Bill returns, 1900-2006 for the UK are 1%, 1.2% and 
6.4% respectively, whereas the equivalent gilt returns data are 1.3%, 2.2% and 13.9%.  
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 Theoretically, the risk-free comparator should be a bond with the same duration as the investment 
opportunity being appraised.  
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 To facilitate comparison of Gilt and equity returns, the equity data from table 1 are repeated in Table 
2. 
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The average expected real return on gilts from Table 2 is, at 2.25%, close to the 
arithmetic average of the realised return from Dimson et al (2007), but the standard 
deviation of the expected returns is far lower at only 3.51%.  This suggests that most 
of the variation in realised real returns comes from unanticipated inflation shocks, as 
any variation in the expected real long gilt rate would show up in the standard 
deviation of expected returns. 
 
We also examine the distributional properties of these estimates of expected returns, 
risk premia and growth.  Actual returns suffer from being both significantly skewed 
and leptokurtic, and a joint test for normality show that this can be clearly rejected.  
By contrast, for expected returns (RDt and RYt) we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
of a normal distribution in expected returns.  Of course, if the growth in earnings or 
dividends, the fundamentals on which equities should priced, were non-normal, then 
there would be no reason to expect realised returns to exhibit normality.  However, 
tests show that although there is weak evidence of skewness in earnings growth, 
normality cannot be rejected for either earnings growth or dividend growth.
17
  We 
also test our fundamental-to-price ratios and growth observations for the presence of 
unit roots, and find that we can reject the hypothesis of a unit root in any of the 
estimates of Dp/Pt-1, Yp/Pt-1, GD or GY, implying that all are mean-reverting. 
 
Finally, as a cross-check we derive expected returns from the Ohlson and Juettner-
Nauroth (2005) FEG model.  As explained above, in its two-period growth form the 
model places certain restrictions on the allowable level of short run and long run 
earnings growth.  As this is clearly violated in individual years, the model can only be 
estimated for the entire sample period.  Short run growth is estimated by taking the 
arithmetic average of the individual years‟ real earnings growth.  The Shiller long run 
earnings estimate is then constructed as described above, with the first ten-year 
estimate being formed in 1937.  The real earnings index and the implied price to long 
run real earnings ratios are illustrated in Figure 3.  Successive annualised 10 year 
changes are then calculated and the arithmetic mean of these (0.73%) is taken as the 
estimate of long run real earnings growth. Over the same period the short-run annual 
growth rate arithmetic mean is 1.55%.  Solving (3) above using these estimates yields 
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 Even in log form Rt is both skewed and leptokurtic.     
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an estimated cost of equity capital of 6.25%, a little above that obtained from the 
dividend and earnings growth model (5.8%).  Of course, this estimate is highly 
sensitive to the short run growth in earnings that is assumed.  Assuming short run 
growth equal to long run growth reduces the implied cost of equity to 5.31%.     
 
Forecasting dividend and earnings growth 
Whether or not longer run real dividend or earnings growth is predictable has 
important implications for estimating future expected returns.  As is well known, if 
real dividend growth is essentially unpredictable and serially uncorrelated, then the 
best unbiased estimate of future dividend growth rate will be the past arithmetic 
average dividend growth.  To appraise the predictability of dividend growth, the FF 
regressions of dividend growth on various predictor variables available at time t are 
run.  Specifically, real dividend growth (earnings growth) is regressed on the lagged 
dividend payout ratio, the lagged dividend/price ratio, lagged dividend (earnings) 
growth, and lagged market returns.  Lagged price growth was included as an 
alternative to lagged market returns, but as the regressions were marginally less 
significant only the former are reported.  Given the evidence that stock returns can be 
predicted by interest rate variables as well as the lagged dividend yield, variables 
capturing the lagged T-Bill rate, the term structure of interest rates and the gilt-equity 
ratio were included in regressions, but as none of these terms proved significant again 
only the basic regressions are reported
18
 in Table 3.  Dividend predictions are shown 
in the first four columns, whilst earnings predictions are shown in the last four 
columns.   
 
Starting in 1955, quarterly estimates of GDP growth are available.  Accordingly, 
taking care that estimates of economic growth would have been available to the 
market, we investigate whether any of the components of GDP are able to predict 
dividend or earnings growth.  Post 1955, GDP, Consumption and Capital Formation 
(Investment) growth are included as independent variables, measured on a September 
to September basis to allow for delay in publication of the GDP figures.  It turns out 
that investment growth has greater power to explain dividend and earnings growth 
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 Note that these regressions can only be estimated for 1928 on as the dividend payout ratio requires an 
earnings estimate to be available. 
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than either GDP or consumption growth, and so only regressions using investment 
growth are reported. 
  
Taking the whole period regressions first, at the one year horizon real dividend 
growth exhibits considerable predictability, and is forecast by the past market returns, 
the lagged dividend yield, the lagged growth in dividends, and the payout ratio.  All of 
the coefficients exhibit the sign one would expect from theory.  As in the early years 
of the FF study, the association of dividend growth with payout ratio is negative, as 
theory would predict given growth is likely to be lower when payout ratios are higher.   
The adjusted R-squared is similar to that of FF, at 35.2%.   
 
The real contrast with FF comes about when the post 1955 period is examined.  For 
the period 1955-1999, FF find that only the past year‟s return is a significant 
explanatory variable, and their adjusted R-squared is a tiny 1%.  In the regression 
reported in the third and fourth columns, one year ahead dividend growth remains 
predictable, with an adjusted R-squared of 36%.  The payout remains significant but 
the one year growth in dividends becomes only marginally significant in the presence 
of lagged investment growth in the economy, which turns out to be a significant 
predictor of dividend growth.  However, the lagged dividend yield loses its 
explanatory power.  One point to note is that the adjusted R-squared figure is far 
higher than that reported in Vivian (2007), and that is probably explained by the 
inclusion of payout ratios and investment growth, neither of which feature in Vivian‟s 
regressions, and both of which are significant. 
 
Columns 5-6 of Table 3 show that earnings growth is considerably less predictable 
than dividend growth.  This contrasts with the FF finding, where earnings growth is 
the more predictable variable.  Taking the whole period, only the lagged one and two 
year market return have significant explanatory power, and the adjusted R-squared is 
only 17.6%.  For the period 1955 on (reported in the final columns of Table 3), only 
the lagged Investment growth and the two-year lagged market returns have weak 
power (significant at the 10% level) to explain earnings growth.  The adjusted R-
squared is 20.8%. 
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Unreported regressions for longer horizons suggest that any predictability in 
dividends and earnings growth for the whole period is limited to a role for the two 
year lagged return, with investment growth just failing to be significant.   
 
Combining dividend regressions with long run forecasts 
The conclusion from the analysis of the dividend and earnings growth regressions is 
that although one year growth has some predictability, which might argue the case for 
using a regression model to forecast short run growth, longer term growth, at least in 
dividends, is harder to predict.  Crucially, we need to know whether the in-sample 
predictive power of dividend and earnings growth models described above extends to 
out of sample forecasting.  In this respect, Vivian (2007) provides evidence that 
although in sample a-year and 5-year growth rates are predictable, out of sample the 
long run average provides the best estimate of expected dividend growth.  However, 
we have shown that it is possible to build a better model of predicted dividend and 
earnings growth one period ahead.  In general, if long run growth is unpredictable, 
then the best forecast of future dividend growth would be the long run arithmetic 
average growth rate.  Whether it is better to use the long run average or to employ a 
forecasting model to estimate growth has clear implications for the estimation of the 
expected risk premium in the future. 
 
Accordingly, we compare two simple models that can be used to estimate short-run 
growth in earnings or dividends.  We first estimate a recursive regression model in the 
spirit of the type of model used in Pesaran and Timmermman (1995; 2000).    
Specifically, we assume that investors use the past 25 years of data
19
 to estimate 
parameters, but that they update their set of regressors to include lagged economic 
indicators once they have been available for the requisite period.  The alternative 
model is simply to use the long run arithmetic average growth up until that point.  The 
errors from these two approaches are summarised in Table 4, where we calculate 
mean errors, mean absolute errors, and mean squared errors.  For earnings‟ forecasts, 
the results are unambiguous – the regression model dominates the use of long run 
averages whichever estimate of error is employed.  For the dividend growth model, 
the regression model has an upward bias compared to long run averages, in that the 
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 Of course, one can argue for alternative long horizon estimates.  Results using ten year rolling 
forecasts are qualitatively similar. 
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mean error is 0.73% compared to the error from the use of long run averages of 
0.14%.  Nonetheless, the regression model exhibits lower absolute errors and lower 
mean squared errors.  The implication is that in terms of estimating the expected 
return on equity or expected risk premium, we can do better by employing a direct 
estimate of likely short run growth.  This suggests alternative model for the 
investigation of historically expected returns on equity, so we estimate short run 
expected growth using a recursive model, with long run growth being estimated on 
the equivalent period‟s rolling average growth. 
 
Doing so yields some interesting results, which are shown in Table 5.  Whilst the 
estimates from this exercise are slightly higher than those shown in Tables 1 and 2, at 
5.87% and 5.99% from the dividend and earnings growth models respectively, they 
exhibit very low volatility, as might be expected from the use of long run average 
growth rates.  Arguably, this much “tighter” estimate of rationally expected future 
returns helps in addressing Cochrane‟s (2001) “surprisingly underappreciated 
problem”.  The individual year estimates from this process are summarised in Figure 
4. 
 
So in very round numbers, it seems that investors may have been pricing equities as 
though they thought an expected real return of around 5.8% to 6% was reasonable.  
Historically, all our estimates seem to converge on this range of numbers.  Of course, 
in the end they were pleasantly surprised, if one takes an average of annually realised 
returns as one‟s guide, as that figure reveals a return of 8.14% over our sample period.  
Perhaps more interesting is that over the long haul, their arithmetic average 
expectations would have roughly been in line with the realised geometric average 
return over this same period, which was 6.01% (Table 1).   
 
Implications for the expected return and the equity risk premium  
The critical choices when forecasting the expected return are: the expected short-run 
and long-run dividend growth; the adjustment needed (if any) to arrive at a simple 
annual rate for discounting purposes, and; whether to make a conditional forecast (i.e. 
one based on the current dividend yield) or an unconditional one (based on the 
assumption of mean reversion to the long run dividend yield).  The latter 
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unconditional estimate will usually imply a short run change in market prices so that 
the dividend yield reverts to its long run mean value.   
 
We start with summarising the unconditional estimates from our various models in 
Table 6.  We show (for all models except the FEG model) the results from using the 
full period for which historical returns are available, and the period from 1975 
onwards.  If the Table 1 and 2 estimates are viewed as unconditional, and market 
prices are formed on the basis of rational expectations (in particular this implies that 
prices are not excessively volatile), then as Fama and French (2002) show, the 
estimation of an expected annual simple return (assuming this is equivalent to the 
arithmetic average return) requires that the estimates formed from the mean dividend 
or earnings growth model expected returns are uplifted by half the difference between 
the variance of the price growth series and the variance of the dividend growth (or 
earnings growth) model returns.  If one believes that it is the risk premium that is 
stationary, then as these are historical estimates, the appropriate risk free rate would 
be the historical real yield on gilts.  The resulting calculations (for expected returns on 
the market and the expected risk premium) are shown in the “bias adjusted” columns 
of Table 6.  The implied expected “bias adjusted” return on the dividend growth 
model is then 7.50%, and the historical arithmetic risk premium is 5.25%.  Because 
the increased volatility of the earnings growth series results in a much smaller “bias 
adjustment”, the implied expected arithmetic return on the earnings growth model is 
7.03% and the expected risk premium over gilts is 4.76%.  From 1975 onwards, 
although expected returns have been higher, the lower volatility in price growth (see 
Table 1) implies a considerably smaller bias adjustment leading to lower expected 
returns (7.17% and 6.88% from dividend and earnings growth models respectively) 
and lower risk premia (4.92% and 4.63% respectively).  If one accepts the arguments 
of Wright et al (2003) that the expected return on equities may be more stable than the 
expected risk premium, and the data in Table 2 lend some support to this, then it 
would be preferable to estimate the expected return on equities, rather than the equity 
risk premium, directly.  Furthermore, following the Jenkinson (1993) argument, this is 
important if the intention is to use the current yield on Gilts (as appears to be 
regulatory practice) in calculations of the cost of equity capital.   
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However, these calculations in the “bias adjusted” columns of Table 6 make the 
strong assumption that there is no excess volatility in market prices.  As we discuss 
below, it seems hard to argue that prices should ultimately be more volatile than the 
fundamentals that drive valuation.  Such a view leads to the conclusion that a bias 
adjustment is inappropriate in the determination of rational discount rates and 
estimates of the cost of equity capital.  The calculations in the “no bias adjustment” 
columns of Table 6 show the expected return and premium without such bias 
adjustment.  Implied returns for the simple DGM and YGM models are, of course, 
then identical to the historical estimates in Table 2, but we also show the effect of 
estimating the risk premium using both the FEG/Shiller model (estimated with two 
alternative short run growth assumptions) and the recursive regression model.  The 
implied risk premia range from 2.46% (from the recursive DGM model, 1975 on) to 
4.0% from the FEG/Shiller model estimated with a higher short run growth rate.   
 
The important point in the above analysis is that unless one believes market prices 
are, on average, rational, then adjusting these historical observations for half the 
difference in variance between actual price growth and fundamental growth merely 
serves to give estimated costs of equity, or estimated risk premia, an upward bias.  Yet 
the evidence in favour of excess volatility seems compelling (for a review, see Shiller 
2003).  Of course, both future dividends and future discount rates can change,   so that 
simply focussing on expected fundamentals and growth in fundamentals ignores 
expected discount rate changes.  If one combines high enough growth assumptions 
with a low enough assumed ex-ante premium, as Rm and gt in (1) converge, one can 
justify historically observed volatility levels.  This is the basic approach taken in 
Armitage et al (2009). However, there are several problems with this approach.  First, 
as we note above, as we can reject the hypothesis of a unit root in any of the estimates 
of Dp/Pt-1, Yp/Pt-1, GD or GY, the implication is that all are mean-reverting.  If there 
were permanent shifts in expected returns, then either growth or the dividend (or 
earnings) to price ratio should exhibit signs of stationarity, and they do not.  As 
Campbell and Shiller (1997) observe, if the level of Dp/Pt-1 does not permanently 
change, then its level must be forecasting something – either it signals changes in the 
expected growth in the fundamentals so that Dp/Pt-1 mean reverts, or it must be 
forecasting mean reversion through price changes.  They provide evidence for the 
latter and that is consistent with what we observe here. Further evidence in favour of 
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the excess volatility hypothesis can be found in studies of the cross-section of stock 
returns, where research evidence, backed by recent theoretical models, shows both 
short term under-reaction and long term over reaction (Subrahmanyam, 2007).  
Finally, recall that the basic Fama-French (2002) projections replicated in Tables 1 
and 2 make the unreasonable assumption that investors project the future from the 
past year, so that the estimates from such a naïve model will almost certainly over-
estimate expected changes in fundamentals.  On balance, it seems difficult to justify 
the assumption of an uplift to historically expected return estimates, particularly if 
they imply substantial corrections to market prices.  So at this point, we move on to 
consider what may be implied by these prices at the end of our study. 
 
Ex ante estimates at the end of our sample period 
The long run average dividend to opening price ratio in December 2009 was 4.7% 
compared to the long run average real dividend/opening price ratio (see Table 1) of 
4.58%. However, that ratio owes a great deal to depressed opening prices.  Prices rose 
by just over 22% in 2009, and the end December 2009 dividend yield on the FTASI 
had fallen to 3.2%.  Converting this to a forecast real D2010/P2009 requires a forecast of 
short run real dividend growth.  Applying the dividend growth model in Table 3 gives 
a forecast growth for 2010 of -6.66%.. The earnings growth version of the model 
suggests a steeper decline of 12.3%.  The implied expected return is then given as 
follows.  First, in the case of the dividend growth model, the expected dividend to 
opening price ratio will be 3.2% x (1-0.066) = 2.99%.  Expected long run growth 
(from our 25 rolling average end in 2009) is 1.06%, implying an expected long run 
return (from [2]) above of 4.05% real.  The earnings growth model is estimated in a 
similar fashion.  These calculations are given in the first column, rows 1 and 2, of 
Table 7. Alternatively, one can simply ignore the regression model altogether and 
simply take the latest 25 year average long run arithmetic average growth rate in 
dividends (earnings) as the indicator of both short run and long run growth.
20
  This 
would forecast the dividend to opening price ratio of 3.2% x (1 + 0.0121) = 3.24%.  
Adding the long run growth of 1.06% suggests an expected real return to equities of 
4.30%.  A similar calculation for the earnings model gives an estimate of 4.46%.  
These calculations form the basis of the last two rows in Table 7.  Any bias 
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sample returns, as in Vivian (2007). 
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adjustment now needs to reflect the much lower variance of the recursive regression 
estimates from the bottom panel of Table 5, together with the variance of prices in the 
twenty five year period ending in December 2009.  Half the difference in the 
variances then gives the potential bias adjustment, which is shown in the third column 
of Table 7.  The bias-adjusted costs of equity range from 5.32% to a maximum of 
5.76%.  Last, as these are current ex ante returns the appropriate risk free rate is the 
December 2009 medium term index-linked gilt yield which was 1.14%.  The resultant 
risk premia range from 4.18% to 4.62% on a bias-adjusted basis, and from 2.89% to 
3.32% on a non-bias adjusted basis.   
 
The clear implication of these numbers is that future returns on equities are likely to 
be well below historically expected returns.  Alternatively, an interpretation of this 
forecast is that a reversion to the long run mean real dividend/opening price ratio of 
4.58% by the end of 2010 would imply a serious correction to December 2009 prices. 
 
Of course, one can argue for higher long run expected growth estimates, possibly as 
high as the rate of GDP growth or at least GDP per capita growth.  The Dimson et al 
(2005) long run (1900-2004) estimate of GDP per capita growth is 1.83%  for the UK.  
However, the Dimson et al (Ch. 3, 2005) results (which update those of Bernstein and 
Arnott, 2003) show that dividend growth is less than GDP growth, and indeed less 
than GDP per capita growth, in most countries.  The rationale for this, put forward in 
Bernstein and Arnott (2003), is that a substantial part of economic growth comes from 
entrepreneurial activity and new firms not included in the main market indices.  Set in 
that context, the growth estimates from the recursive model look to be towards the 
higher end of reasonable expectations. 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
The above estimates raise several issues.  Leaving aside the question of the risk 
premium, and concentrating on the expected cost of equity, we first have the question 
of whether to use the historical ex ante estimates presented in Table 6, or the current 
ex ante estimates from Table 7.  The former are appropriate bases if we believe mean-
reversion will hold, but the uncomfortable corollary is that these estimates imply that 
the market is over-valued as of December 2009.  The alternative is to assume that 
some permanent shift in expectations has taken place, and that markets are correctly 
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valued, in which case the Table 7 estimates would be preferred.  A second and 
arguably related question is what should be done about the possible bias adjustment?  
If we start with a contemporary (December 2009) estimate, then it seems reasonable 
to recognise that price volatility could be important, given the central estimate is of 
permanently lower expected returns than the long run historical averages.  As such, 
incorporating a bias adjustment seems reasonable.  However, if we start with the 
assumption of mean-reversion, then large price falls are already implied by the 
forecast, so that embedding a potential bias adjustment could be viewed as double-
counting.  Furthermore, an expected price-correction implicitly recognises that prices 
are excessively volatile, so that incorporating a bias-adjustment that essentially 
reflects investor irrationality seems highly questionable.  
 
Last, a real question for regulatory purposes is whether a simple expected rate of 
return is actually appropriate.  Returning to the fact that Fama (1996) highlights the 
implied right skew in cash flow estimates is a corollary of discounting at expected 
simple rates of return, it is by no means obvious that such cash flow forecasts are 
compatible with regulatory budgeted cash flows, which one could argue are more 
likely to be based upon median cash flows or an assumption of normally distributed 
cash flows.  In addition, there are the estimation bias issues highlighted by Blume 
(1973) and Indro and Lee (1997) which point to the use of a weighted average of 
arithmetic and geometric mean returns in estimating required rates of return.  In short, 
it is far from obvious that the potential bias adjusted simple rates of return derived 
above can be unambiguously recommended as providing the optimal estimate of 
equity cost of capital for regulatory purposes even if there is no “excess volatility” in 
market prices. 
 
The focus of the paper has been on arithmetic averages, or estimates of the simple 
annual rate of return, which feature heavily in applications such as discount rate 
estimation and regulatory cost of capital.  We have shown that historical estimates of 
the mean of the long run expected return on equities are between 5.29% and 6.76% 
resulting in an arithmetic risk premium over gilts of between 2.46% and 3.93%.  This 
estimate of the risk premium over gilts treats expected inflation in equity and gilt 
returns consistently, something which past studies miss by focussing on realised 
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returns on gilts.  These risk premia are lower than the figures typically quoted in UK 
utility regulation price-setting exercises. 
 
Estimates of the expected arithmetic average return on equities going forward depend 
upon the growth rates assumed for future dividends and on the procedure used to 
estimate return volatility.  The recent extreme movement in markets cause problems 
for any estimation of the expected return based on current yields and prices, but 
reasonable estimates that incorporate a “Fama-French bias adjustment” suggest the 
maximum expected cost of equity is between 5.32% and 5.76%.  This translates into a 
risk premium of 4.18% to 4.62% purely because of the currently low level of risk-free 
rates.  Of course, if one believes that current market prices are rational, a case can be 
made for dropping any such bias adjustment and then the risk premium is in the range 
2.89% to 3.32%. 
 
Two central recommendations for regulatory practice are: consistency in estimating 
the risk premium, in that estimating an expected cost of equity directly, and then 
deducting the chosen risk-free rate is the preferred approach, and; consistency in the 
approach to estimating ex ante returns is preferred.  We can either assume reversion 
to the mean in fundamentals to price ratios, which implies there is no need for any 
uplift to expected returns.  Alternatively, we can assume no mean reversion, in which 
case some allowance for potential price volatility seems reasonable.  Indeed, given 
uncertainty about possible outcomes, some sort of weighted average might be a 
possibility.  Such an approach might suggest the reasonable range of expected cost of 
equity is between 5.5% and 6%. 
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Appendix 1: Equity Market data descriptors from Global Financial Data  
From http://www.globalfinancialdata.com/index.php3?action=detailedinfo&id=2546 
 
Stock market data: 
Country: United Kingdom 
Begins: December 1923 and January 1939 
Sources: Journal of the Institute of Actuaries, (LXII), part 2, no. 304, pp. 321-331, 
New York Stock Exchange Bulletin (1929-1938), Central Statistical Office Annual 
Abstract of Statistics, London: CSO (1939-1988), Eurostat (1989-) for the 
Financial Times-Actuaries yields and The Economist (1939-1965), Central 
Statistical Office, Monthly Digest of Statistics, London: CSO (1966-) for the FTI-
30 yields; London and Cambridge Economic Service, Key Statistics of the British 
Economy, London: L&CES, 1966 for earnings yield from 1927 through 1962. 
Notes: Dividend yields were calculated by the Actuaries beginning in 1923. Monthly 
yields for the Financial Times 30 industrials are also provided.  All yield data are 
monthly. The Financial Times calculated earnings yield data (E/P) rather than 
price/earnings ratios, so earnings yield data have been inverted to give the price 
earnings ratio. Price/earnings ratios are provided for the FTI-30 index beginning 
in 1955 with data annual through 1966 and monthly thereafter.  The price/earnings 
ratio is also provided for the Financial Times-Actuaries Index with annual data 
from 1927 through 1962 and monthly data beginning in April 1962. This series is 
based upon data calculated for the Actuaries General index through 1962, the FT 
Non-Financials from April 1962 through January 1993, and the FT All-Share from 
February 1993, which begins daily data on June 14, 1993 on. 
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Table 1 Inflation, real Treasury Bill, dividend and earnings growth, market returns and expected real returns, 1925-2009.  
 Inft TBt Dt/Pt-1 GDt GYt GPt RDt RYt Rt RXDt RXYt RXt 
Means of annual values             
1925/8-1950 1.10% 0.83% 4.62% 1.34% 1.73% 1.11% 5.96% 6.33% 5.92% 5.13% 6.29% 5.09% 
1951-1975 6.14% -0.56% 5.12% -0.12% -1.10% 3.80% 5.00% 4.01% 9.29% 5.56% 4.57% 9.85% 
1975-2009 5.44% 2.74% 4.16% 2.08% 2.59% 4.46% 6.25% 6.76% 8.99% 3.50% 4.01% 6.25% 
1951-2009 5.74% 1.34% 4.57% 1.15% 1.03% 4.18% 5.72% 5.59% 9.12% 4.37% 4.25% 7.77% 
1925/8-2009 4.32% 1.19% 4.58% 1.21% 1.22% 3.24% 5.79% 5.80% 8.14% 4.61% 4.82% 6.95% 
Standard Deviation of Annual Values             
1925/8-1950 4.39% 5.16% 0.63% 9.58% 11.55% 13.70% 9.31% 11.31% 13.98% 10.10% 13.27% 13.83% 
1951-1975 5.48% 3.81% 1.46% 7.03% 10.34% 29.12% 7.28% 10.06% 30.81% 7.70% 11.73% 31.46% 
1975-2009 4.23% 2.88% 1.14% 6.80% 14.38% 15.17% 7.10% 14.34% 15.92% 6.71% 14.66% 15.76% 
1951-2009 4.81% 3.68% 1.37% 6.98% 12.95% 22.18% 7.20% 12.77% 23.41% 7.22% 13.50% 23.78% 
1925/8-2009 5.18% 4.22% 1.20% 7.92% 12.65% 20.14% 7.95% 12.46% 21.16% 8.26% 13.55% 21.40% 
Geometric Average             
1925/8-1950 1.01% 0.70%  0.88% 1.01% 0.16%   4.97%    
1951-1975 6.01% -0.63%  -0.36% -1.68% -0.47%   4.82%    
1975-2009 5.35% 2.70%  1.85% 1.25% 3.25%   7.71%    
1951-2009 5.63% 1.28%  0.91% 0.15% 1.66%   6.47%    
1925/8-2009 4.20% 1.10%  0.90% 0.39% 1.20%   6.01%    
The columns show respectively the arithmetic averages, standard deviations and geometric averages for inflation (Inft), real Treasury Bill returns 
(TBt) real dividends over opening prices (Dt/Pt-1), real growth in dividends (GDt), real growth in earnings (GYt), real growth in equity market 
prices (GPt), the estimated forward return from the dividend growth model (RDt = Dt/Pt-1 + GDt), the estimated forward return from the earnings 
growth model (RYt = Dt/Pt-1 + GYt), the realised real return on the market index (Rt), and the estimated risk premia over Treasury Bills resulting 
from the dividend growth (RXDt = RDt – TBt), earnings growth (RYDt = RYt – TBt) and market return (RXt) models, respectively. 
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Table 2 Real Gilt yields, dividend and earnings growth, market returns and expected real returns, 1925-2009. 
 GILTt RDt RYt Rt RXgDt RXgYt RXgt 
Means of annual values        
1925/8-1950 2.59% 5.96% 6.33% 5.92% 3.37% 4.31% 3.32% 
1951-1975 1.10% 5.00% 4.01% 9.29% 3.90% 2.92% 8.19% 
1975-2009 2.83% 6.25% 6.76% 8.99% 3.42% 3.93% 6.16% 
1951-2009 2.10% 5.72% 5.59% 9.12% 3.62% 3.50% 7.02% 
1925/8-2009 2.25% 5.79% 5.80% 8.14% 3.54% 3.73% 5.89% 
Standard Deviation of Annual 
Values        
1925/8-1950 4.66% 9.31% 11.31% 13.98% 9.91% 13.02% 13.76% 
1951-1975 3.05% 7.28% 10.06% 30.81% 7.82% 11.33% 31.54% 
1975-2009 2.24% 7.10% 14.34% 15.92% 7.12% 14.80% 15.64% 
1951-2009 2.75% 7.20% 12.77% 23.41% 7.43% 13.45% 23.74% 
1925/8-2009 3.47% 7.95% 12.46% 21.16% 8.31% 13.42% 21.39% 
 
The columns show respectively the arithmetic averages, standard deviations and geometric averages for real expected Gilt yields (GILTt), the 
estimated forward return from the dividend growth model (RDt = Dt/Pt-1 + GDt), the estimated forward return from the earnings growth model 
(RYt = Dt/Pt-1 + GYt), the realised real return on the market index (Rt), and the estimated risk premia over Gilt yields resulting from the dividend 
growth (RXgDt = RDt – GILTt), earnings growth (RYgDt = RYt – GILTt) and market return (RgXt) models, respectively. 
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Table 3 Real Dividend and Earnings growth regressions. The columns show the 
results of regressing the real growth in dividends (GDt) or the real growth in earnings 
(GYt), on the following variables: lagged real realised return on the market index  
(Rt-1), (Rt-2); ), lagged real dividend or real earnings yield ratios (Dt-1/Pt-2), (Et-1/Pt-2); 
lagged real dividend growth (GDt-1) or real growth in earnings (GYt-1); lagged 
dividend payout ratios (t-1); and lagged Gross Domestic Capital Formation 
(Investment) growth (I t-1). 
 
 
Dependent 
Variable: 
GDt 
Full period 
GDt 
Post 1955 
GYt 
Full period 
GYt 
Post 1955 
Independent 
variables: 
        
Rt-1 0.182 *** 0.103 ** 0.168 ** 0.113   
 4.59  2.44  2.53  1.33  
Rt-2 0.117 *** 0.076 ** 0.175 *** 0.145 * 
 2.99  2.03  2.72  1.93  
Dt-1/Pt-2 -1.331 * -0.404       
 -1.73  -0.54      
Et-1/Pt-2     -0.878   -1.117   
     -1.65  -1.66  
GDt-1 0.225 ** 0.223 *     
 2.3  1.77      
GYt-1     0.166   0.157   
     1.44  1.06  
Payout ratio 
(t-1) 
-0.141 ** -0.145 ** -0.104   -0.096   
 -2.24  -2.05  -0.61  -0.43  
I t-1   0.39 **   0.601 * 
   2.53    1.86  
_cons 0.118 ** 0.076   0.12   0.114   
 2.17  1.33  0.91  0.66  
Adjusted R
2
 0.352  0.360  0.176  0.208  
Probability 
(F-test) 
0.000  0.000  0.001  0.008  
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Table 4: Out of Sample Forecasting Errors. The table shows Mean Error, Mean 
Absolute Error, and Mean Squared Error for one period ahead forecasts from two 
alternative forecasting models.  These models are from rolling 25 year regression 
models estimated using the regressions described in Table 3, and a simple long-run 
mean to date growth estimate for both dividend and earnings growth. 
 
 
 Dividend Growth 
Model 
  
Earnings Growth 
Model 
  
Error 
measure: 
GD 
Regression 
Long 
run 
average 
GD 
GY 
Regression 
Long 
run 
average 
GY 
Mean error 0.73% 0.14% -0.06% 0.20% 
Mean absolute 
error 
3.93% 5.66% 7.26% 10.34% 
Mean squared 
error  
0.25% 0.50% 0.91% 1.73% 
 
 
 
Table 5: Expected return on equity estimates from the recursive regression 
model. 
The estimates are made by employing the rolling 25 year regression models estimated 
using the regressions described in Table 3 to estimate the forecast dividend one period 
ahead, and then using the 25-year rolling mean to forecast either long-run dividend or 
earnings growth 
 
Full period GD model GY model 
Mean estimated expected return 5.87% 5.99% 
Standard deviation of expected return 1.44% 1.92% 
1951-1975   
Mean estimated expected return 6.72% 6.99% 
Standard deviation of expected return 1.63% 1.99% 
1975-2009   
Mean estimated expected return 5.29% 5.44% 
Standard deviation of expected return 0.89% 1.52% 
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 Table 6: Historical mean Ex ante simple annual return estimates.   
 
Basis of estimation Potential 
“bias 
adjustment” 
basis 
E(Rm) 
with no 
bias 
adjustment 
Potential 
bias 
adjustment 
E(Rm) with 
bias 
adjustment  
Gilt 
yield 
ERP with 
bias 
adjustment 
ERP with 
no bias 
adjustment 
LR historical DGM post 1925 1/2 diff 5.79% 1.71% 7.50% 2.25% 5.25% 3.54% 
LR historical YGM post 1928 1/2 diff 5.80% 1.23% 7.03% 2.25% 4.78% 3.55% 
LR historical DGM post 1975 1/2 diff 6.25% 0.92% 7.17% 2.83% 4.34% 3.42% 
LR historical YGM post 1975 1/2 diff 6.76% 0.12% 6.88% 2.83% 4.05% 3.93% 
FEG/Shiller SRG > LRG none 6.25% n.a. n.a. 2.25% n.a. 4.00% 
FEG/Shiller SRG = LRG none 5.31% n.a. n.a. 2.25% n.a. 3.06% 
Recursive regression estimates, DGM full 
period 
none 5.87% n.a. n.a. 
2.25% n.a. 3.62% 
Recursive regression estimates, YGM full 
period  
none 5.99% n.a. n.a. 
2.25% n.a. 3.74% 
Recursive regression estimates, DGM 1975 
on 
none 5.29% n.a. n.a. 
2.83% n.a. 2.46% 
Recursive regression estimates, YGM 1975 
on 
none 5.44% n.a. n.a. 
2.83% n.a. 2.61% 
 
 
Columns show: the basis of the estimate (LR = long run, DGM = dividend growth, YGM = earnings growth); the type of “bias” adjustment 
employed (if any), where “1/2 diff” refers to an uplift of half the difference between the historical price growth variance and the historical 
dividend or earnings growth variance; the base estimate (D1/P0 + Growth, variously estimated); the amount of the bias adjustment; the resulting 
ex ante annual simple return estimate; the consistent estimate of gilt return (the historical real gilt yield); and the resultant estimate of the equity 
risk premium over the gilt rate with and without “bias” adjustment.   
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Table 7: Ex ante returns as at December 2009.   
Basis of estimation Potential 
“bias 
adjustment” 
basis 
E(Rm) 
with no 
bias 
adjustment 
Potential 
bias 
adjustment 
E(Rm) with 
bias 
adjustment  
Gilt 
yield 
ERP with 
bias 
adjustment 
ERP with 
no bias 
adjustment 
Dec 09 DY, SRGD & LRGD 1/2 diff 4.05% 1.30% 5.35% 1.14% 4.21% 2.91% 
Dec 09 DY, SRGY & LRGY 1/2 diff 4.03% 1.29% 5.32% 1.14% 4.18% 2.89% 
Dec 09 DY,  LRGD 1/2 diff 4.30% 1.30% 5.60% 1.14% 4.46% 3.16% 
Dec 09 DY,  LRGY 1/2 diff 4.46% 1.29% 5.76% 1.14% 4.62% 3.32% 
 
Columns show: the basis of the estimate (SR = short run, LR = long run, GD = dividend growth, GY = earnings growth); the type of “bias” 
adjustment employed (if any), where “1/2 diff” refers to an uplift of half the difference between the historical price growth variance and the 
historical dividend or earnings growth variance; the base estimate (D2010/P2009 + Growth, variously estimated); the amount of the potential bias 
adjustment; the resulting ex ante annual simple return estimate; the consistent estimate of gilt return (the ex ante real gilt yield); and the resultant 
estimate of the equity risk premium over the gilt rate with and without “bias” adjustment. 
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 Figure 1: Real dividend and earnings yields for the UK 
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Figure 2: Real Earnings and Real Dividend Growth Rates in UK 
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Figure 3: Rolling average 10 year real earnings and Price-ten year average real earnings ratio for UK 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
19
36
19
40
19
45
19
50
19
55
19
60
19
65
19
70
19
75
19
80
19
85
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
Year
L
o
n
g
 R
u
n
 R
e
a
l 
E
a
rn
in
g
s
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
R
o
ll
in
g
 1
0
-y
e
a
r 
P
E
 r
a
ti
o
LR engs index
PE10
 
 40 
Figure 4: Annual estimates of cost of equity from recursive estimates 
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